



THE POSITION OF INTUITION IN THE CONTEXT OF ARISTOTLE AND AL-FARABI'S VIEWS ON INTELLECT AND KNOWLEDGE

A posição da intuição no contexto das visões de Aristóteles e Al-Farabi sobre o intelecto e o conhecimento.

Ayşe ACARER*

Süleyman Demirel University, Faculty of Theology, Türkiye

DOI: [10.29327/256659.15.3-25](https://doi.org/10.29327/256659.15.3-25)

ABSTRACT

This study presents a comparative analysis of the epistemological and methodological frameworks of Aristotle and Abu Nasr al-Farabi, focusing particularly on the interaction between intellect (*nous*/*akl*), knowledge (*episteme*/*ilm*), and direct intellectual insight ('intuition'). Epistemology in classical antiquity and the medieval Islamic philosophical tradition confronted the fundamental problem of grounding scientific demonstration (*apodeixis*/*burhan*) without falling into infinite regress or circular reasoning. Aristotle resolves this dilemma by grounding knowledge in empirical observation (*aisthesis*) and induction (*epagoge*), while assigning to *nous* the non-inferential function of directly apprehending the primary, indemonstrable first principles (*archai*) upon which demonstrative knowledge depends. Reinterpreting and expanding this Aristotelian heritage within classical Islamic philosophy, al-Farabi situates the direct apprehension of intelligibles within a dynamic, developmental framework of human intellectual actualization-advancing from potentiality (*material intellect*) to actuality (*intellect in action*) and ultimately to the *acquired intellect* (*al-'akl al-mustafad*) through its formal relation to the transcendent Active Intellect (*al-'akl al-fa'al*). This investigation clarifies that 'intuition' does not function as an autonomous, mystical, or anti-rational faculty in either thinker's technical lexicon. Instead, it serves as an analytical designation for the direct, non-discursive grasp of primary intelligibles and foundational axioms. This study aims to highlight the differences between Aristotelian and Farabian epistemologies by comparing how both philosophers classified knowledge, explained the transition from sensory experience to universal concepts, and integrated non-discursive intellectual insight into logical reasoning.

Keywords: Logic; Aristotle; Al-Farabi; Epistemology; Intellect; Knowledge; Intuition.

* Research Assistant (Ph.D.), Faculty of Theology, Department of Philosophy and Religious Sciences E-mail: aysesavkliyildiz@sdu.edu.tr

INTRODUCTION

The history of classical philosophy is fundamentally defined by the persistent endeavor to elucidate the structure, limits, and justification of human knowledge (Burnyeat, 1981; Gutas, 2014). Within the Western and Islamic philosophical traditions, the inquiry into how the human mind acquires certainty (*episteme/yaqin*) centers upon a pivotal epistemological challenge: the problem of foundational grounding. If scientific knowledge is defined as demonstrative knowledge derived from prior premises through valid logical inference, the foundational premises from which a demonstration proceeds must themselves be known with absolute certainty (Aristotle, 1951; al-Farabi, 1990c; Ross, 1949). If these initial premises require further demonstrative proof, reasoning is condemned to an infinite regress; if they are accepted without justification, demonstration rests upon arbitrary assumptions.

At the core of classical responses to this fundamental dilemma stand Aristotle and al-Farabi, two seminal figures whose intellectual outputs established the bedrock of Greco-Arabic rationalism. Aristotle resolved the problem of infinite regress by establishing a dual cognitive architecture: while demonstrative syllogism (*apodeixis*) produces scientific knowledge from known premises, the direct, non-inferential apprehension of the first principles (*archai*) is accomplished by *nous*—the intellectual faculty that grasps immediate truths upon the occasion of empirical induction (*epagoge*) (Aristotle, 1951, 1996a; Irwin, 1990). Centuries later, al-Farabi, known in the Arabic philosophical tradition as the ‘Second Teacher’ following Aristotle, inherited this logical corpus and systematically translated, commented upon, and reconstructed Aristotelian metaphysics and epistemology within the intellectual milieu of early Islamic philosophy (Aristotle, 2014a; Gutas, 2014; Peters, 1968).

Al-Farabi did not merely transmit Aristotelian doctrines, he reconfigured the Aristotelian account of *nous* into a comprehensive psychological and metaphysical system of intellectual perfection (al-Farabi, 1983; Davidson, 1992). In Farabian thought, human cognition is structured as a progressive actualization of the mind, ascending from a purely potential state (*material intellect*) to an active state (*intellect in action*), and reaching its apex in the *acquired intellect* (*al-'akl al-mustafad*) (al-Farabi, 1983). This cognitive ascent is mediated by the Active Intellect (*al-'akl al-faal*), a transcendent cosmic intelligence that illuminates human potentiality, transforming implicit sensory concepts into explicit, actualized intelligibles (al-Farabi, 1983, 1990a; Durusoy, 2023; Tekin, 2017).

To conduct a comparative study on Aristotle and al-Farabi, two fundamental methodological and terminological explanations are initially required.

First, the concept of ‘intuition’ utilized throughout this study must not be confused with modern subjective, emotional, or mystical notions of ungrounded insight. Neither Aristotle nor al-Farabi posited an independent, non-rational epistemic faculty called ‘intuition’ operating outside or against the structure of intellect. In Aristotelian Greek, the non-inferential grasp of immediate premises is described as the activity of *nous* (*noesis*) (Aristotle, 2018). In Farabian Arabic, the immediate comprehension of first intelligibles is conceptualized as the actualization of intellect through conjunction (*ittisal*) with the Active Intellect (al-Farabi, 1983). While later Islamic thinkers, most notably Ibn Sina, assigned a highly specific logical function to intuition (*hads*) as the immediate hit upon the middle term of a syllogism, al-Farabi treats direct apprehension as an intrinsic dimension of intellectual perfection (Ibn Sina, 2006; Gutas, 2014; al-Farabi, 1990b). Therefore, in this paper, ‘intuition’ serves strictly as an analytical rubric to designate the direct, non-discursive intellectual apprehension of intelligibles and primary principles within both thinkers’ rational frameworks.

Second, it is crucial to properly situate the position of revelation (*wahy*) in al-Farabi’s philosophy. In his works such as *Kitab al-Mille* and *al-Madinat al-Fadila*, al-Farabi addresses the relationship between philosophy and religion and the nature of prophetic knowledge, while revelation represents the limit of his epistemological framework (al-Farabi, 2021, 2019, 1990a; Aydınli, 2008). Consequently, this study intentionally treats revelation as a boundary context, directing its primary focus to the rational and demonstrative dynamics governing the triangle of intellect, knowledge, and direct intellectual apprehension.

This research aims to identify the points of continuity and divergence between Aristotle and al-Farabi using a textual, historical, and comparative methodology. It addresses how both thinkers construct the taxonomy of knowledge, account for the abstraction of universal forms from empirical particulars, justify the first principles of demonstration, and conceptualize the role of non-discursive apprehension within scientific reasoning. This approach demonstrates that al-Farabi’s epistemological synthesis is not a retreat from Aristotelian rationalism to Neoplatonic mysticism, but rather a developmental expansion of Aristotle’s theory of *nous*.

ARISTOTLE'S VIEW OF INTELLECT

Aristotle bases his epistemological architecture on a classification of human cognitive abilities and modes of knowledge acquisition, which is discussed in detail in the logical treatises of the *Organon* (Aristotle, 2014a, 1996a, 2014b; Özel, 2008). Rejecting the Platonic doctrine of innate Ideas and transcendent forms, Aristotle locates the origin of all intellectual operations within the structural capacity of the human soul (*psuche*) to engage with the external sensible world (Aristotle, 2018). Within this empirical and rational matrix, Aristotle differentiates three primary forms of knowledge (*gnosis*), each corresponding to distinct cognitive ends, objects, and intellectual virtues.

The first form is Theoretical Knowledge (*Episteme*), which represents the highest form of scientific knowledge, directed toward necessary, unchangeable, and eternal realities that cannot be otherwise than they are (Aristotle, 2014a; Irwin, 1990). *Episteme* is demonstrative knowledge derived through syllogistic reasoning (*apodeixis*) from necessary premises (Aristotle, 1951; Ross, 1949). It seeks to grasp the intrinsic essences (*ousia*) and formal, material, efficient, and final causes (*aitia*) of natural and metaphysical beings (Aristotle, 1996a). The second form is Practical Knowledge (*Phronesis*), a deliberative, action-oriented intellectual virtue aimed at practical wisdom, moral judgment, and human flourishing (*eudaimonia*) within contingent, variable spheres of human conduct (Aristotle, 1996a, 2014a). Unlike *episteme*, which deals with universal and immutable truths, *phronesis* operates within the domain of particular circumstances, evaluating what is good and beneficial for human beings in specific ethical and political situations (Aristotle, 2014a; Irwin, 1990). The third form is Technical Knowledge (*Techne*); a productive state (*hexis poietike*) focused on craft, art, and intentional creation (Aristotle, 2014a). *Techne* applies practical skills and general techniques to bring concrete objects into existence, bridging abstract principles of design with practical execution.

In Aristotle's taxonomy, theoretical intellect (*nous theoretikos*) holds ultimate priority because it alone contemplates unalterable starting points and universal principles (Aristotle, 1996a, 2014a). However, the acquisition of theoretical knowledge is not merely a rational endeavour. It represents a continuous process of development that grounds abstract thought in concrete perceptual reality (Aristotle, 1996a; Kaya, 1983; Altunya & Keleş Türkyılmaz, 2023).

Aristotle's epistemological framework is fundamentally empirical in its origin, though non-empiricist in its ultimate justification (Burnyeat, 1981). In *Posterior Analytics* and

Metaphysics, Aristotle delineates the cognitive trajectory through which human beings advance from primitive sensory perception to sophisticated scientific comprehension (Aristotle, 1951, 1996a). This cognitive progression originates directly when an external physical object impacts the sensory organs, triggering immediate sensory perception (*aisthesis*). The persistence and retention of these sensory impressions within the soul give rise to memory (*mneme*). As multiple memories of the same recurring phenomenon accumulate over time, they synthesize into unified experience (*empeiria*). From this consolidated empirical experience, induction (*epagoge*) compares particular instances, allows the mind to abstract common features, and ultimately establishes a stable universal concept (*katholou*) within the intellect.

Experience provides a comprehensive, practical familiarity with particular instances, allowing individuals to recognize *that* (*hoti*) something occurs (Aristotle, 1996a). However, experience alone cannot explain *why* (*dioti*) something occurs; it lacks a grasp of universal causes and explanatory essences (Aristotle, 1996; Burnyeat, 1981). The transition from particular experience (*empeiria*) to universal concept (*katholou*) is facilitated by induction (*epagoge*) (Aristotle, 1951, 2014a; Aydoğan, 2021). Through induction, the mind compares repeated empirical observations, abstracts common structural features, and stabilizes the universal concept within the soul (Aristotle, 1951, 1996a). Aristotle explicitly emphasizes that abstraction (*aphairesis*) is the process whereby intellect strips away particular material conditions -such as size, location, and individual variations- to isolate the essential, universal form (*eidos*) of an object (Aristotle, 1951, 1996a, 2018). Thus, empirical observation provides the indispensable material cause of knowledge, but sensory data must be processed and structured by rational faculties to yield genuine scientific understanding (Aristotle, 1996a, 1951).

To account for the cognitive transformation of sensible forms into abstract intelligible concepts, Aristotle introduces his distinction between the passive intellect (*nous pathetikos*) and the active intellect (*nous poietikos*) (Aristotle, 2018). The passive intellect represents the potentiality (*dynamis*) of the human soul to become all intelligible objects by receiving sensory images (*phantasmata*) transmitted from perception and memory (Aristotle, 2018). Passive intellect is physically grounded, temporary, and receptive; however, it remains bound to concrete perceptual data and cannot realize its own cognitive content (Aristotle, 2018). Conversely, the active intellect is characterized by Aristotle as separate (*choristos*), impassible

(*apathēs*), unmixed (*amiges*), and active by its very essence (*te ousia on energeia*) (Aristotle, 2018). The active intellect functions as an illuminating cause -analogous to light making potential colors actual visible realities- that acts upon the sensory images stored in the passive intellect (Aristotle, 2018).

By illuminating the sensory images (*phantasmata*), the active intellect abstracts universal intelligible forms (*noeta*) from their material substrates, elevating concrete sensory representations to actualized conceptual thoughts (Aristotle, 2018; Aydoğan, 2021). Through this creative and transformative operation, the active intellect enables the human mind to transcend mere sensory receptivity, establishing the structural foundation for abstract reasoning and scientific categorization (Aristotle, 1951, 2018).

In the *Prior* and *Posterior Analytics*, Aristotle establishes logic as the primary instrument for obtaining scientific truth (Aristotle, 1951, 1996b, 1996a). He outlines two fundamental avenues of rational inference: deduction and induction (Aristotle, 1951, 1996a). Deduction is a formal argument in which, certain premises being stated, something else necessarily follows from them (Aristotle, 1996a). In a valid deductive syllogism, if the premises are true and primary, the conclusion reached is necessarily and demonstratively true (Aristotle, 1951, 1996a). For example, deriving the conclusion that ‘Socrates is mortal.’ from the categorical premises ‘All human beings are mortal.’ and ‘Socrates is a human being.’ exemplifies deductive certainty (Aristotle, 1996a, 1996b, 2014a). Deductive demonstration (*apodeixis*) operates by applying universal premises through logical inference to arrive at necessary particular conclusions, making it the gold standard of scientific methodology because it demonstrates the necessary connection between causes and effects (Aristotle, 1951; Ross, 1949).

Induction (*epagoge*), conversely, is the method of ascending from particulars to universals by gathering empirical data, applying comparative analysis, and formulating generalized universal premises (Aristotle, 1951). By observing a consistent pattern across numerous individual cases (e.g., examining various species of animals), induction generalizes common traits to form definitions or universal propositions (Aristotle, 1951, 1996b, 1996c). Aristotle regards induction as essential for empirical science and pedagogical discovery because human cognition naturally moves from what is more recognizable to us (sensory particulars) to what is more recognizable in nature (universal causes) (Aristotle, 1951, 1996a). However, Aristotle explicitly acknowledges the epistemological limitation of induction: complete enumeration of all particular instances is rarely achievable in natural sciences (Aristotle, 1951).

Induction draws attention to universal concepts, but it cannot on its own supply the absolute necessity required for scientific premises (Aristotle, 1951; Burnyeat, 1981). Thus, induction prepares the soul for universal understanding, but a higher epistemic faculty is necessary to grasp the absolute necessity of first principles (Aristotle, 1951, 1996b).

The central theoretical contribution of Aristotle's epistemology lies in his solution to the problem of scientific foundations. In *Posterior Analytics*, Aristotle asserts that scientific knowledge (*episteme*) is produced through demonstration (*apodeixis*). A demonstrative syllogism must proceed from premises that are true, primary (*prota*), immediate (*amesa*), better known than (*gnorimotera*) the conclusion, prior to the conclusion, and explanatory causes (*aitia*) of the conclusion (Aristotle, 1951; Ross, 1949). This stringent definition introduces a crucial epistemological problem: how do we come to know the primary, immediate starting points (*archai*) of demonstration? If scientific knowledge requires demonstration, then the premises of a demonstration must themselves be demonstrated by prior premises (Aristotle, 1951). This requirement leads directly to two conclusions: either an infinite regress occurs where every premise must be proved by a prior premise *ad infinitum*, making demonstration impossible to complete, or vicious circularity occurs where premises are demonstrated by conclusions that depend upon those very premises, reducing science to arbitrary circular reasoning (Aristotle, 1951).

To avoid both infinite regress and circularity, Aristotle contends that there must be non-demonstrable first principles whose truth is apprehended directly and immediately (Aristotle, 1951). The epistemic faculty responsible for this direct, non-inferential apprehension is *nous* (Aristotle, 1951, 2018). As Aristotle conclusively states in *Posterior Analytics*, since among our intellectual states by which we grasp truth some are always true while others admit of falsehood, and no state except *nous* is more precise than *episteme*, it must be *nous* that apprehends the first principles. Therefore, *nous* is the principle of demonstration; as the principle is to the principle, so is all *nous* to all knowledge (Aristotle, 1951; Bolay, 1989).

In this exact structural framework, human cognition relies on empirical data and memory to feed induction (*epagoge*), which in turn enables the direct apprehension of *nous* to grasp indemonstrable *archai*. Once these primary principles are grasped immediately, demonstrative science (*episteme*) utilizes them to derive necessary conclusions through formal syllogistic reasoning. In this context, 'intuition' functions as a term used to describe the non-discursive workings of *nous*, preparing the ground for reasoning (Aydoğan, 2021; Köz, 2004).

Nous does not operate as an irrational insight or a mystical illumination divorced from experience (Burnyeat, 1981; Irwin, 1990). Rather, *nous* is the intellectual realization that occurs when empirical induction (*epagoge*) presents a universal concept to the mind, allowing *nous* to directly see (*noesis*) the intrinsic necessity and self-evident truth of axioms, definitions, and logical principles -such as the law of non-contradiction (Aristotle, 1951, 1996a). Thus, *nous* and demonstrative reasoning (*dianoia*) are not opposing mechanisms; they are structurally interdependent (Aristotle, 1951; Aydoğan, 2021). *Nous* provides the non-inferential, immediate starting points (*archai*), while discursive reasoning uses formal syllogism to unfold the necessary scientific consequences of those principles into a systematic body of knowledge (*episteme*) (Aristotle, 1951; Ross, 1949). In Aristotle's epistemology, intuition -understood as the non-discursive grasp of principles by *nous*- is the indispensable foundation that makes scientific demonstration possible (Aristotle, 1951; Sarı, 2011).

Intuition and reasoning are not alternatives to each other, but two complementary stages in the formation of knowledge: intuition "prepares" for reasoning and precedes it (Köz, 2004). Discovery occurs through intuition, while proof is achieved through reasoning (Aristotle, 1951). Aristotle's epistemology, in this respect, can be seen not as a structure composed of disconnected types of knowledge, but as a process consisting of complementary stages. Sensory perception provides data relating to individual objects; the repetition of this data, preserved in memory, creates experience; and from experience, the inductive process towards grasping the universal takes place (Aristotle, 1996a). At the point reached by this process, *nous* directly grasps the principles upon which scientific knowledge is based. Demonstration, in turn, moves from these principles grasped by *nous* to necessary conclusions, and thus *episteme* emerges (Aristotle, 1951). Sensory experience therefore plays a decisive role at the beginning of the knowledge process, *nous* in the grasping of principles, and demonstrative proof in the establishment of systematic scientific knowledge. In the centuries that followed, this *nous*-centered epistemological legacy of Aristotle would be inherited from classical sources and reconstructed within a new metaphysical and cosmological framework by the tradition of Islamic philosophy, most notably in the thought of al-Farabi.

The Textual Transmission of the Aristotelian Theory of Intellect from Greek Commentators to Baghdad Logicians and Its Background in Al-Farabi

To understand the structural modifications al-Farabi introduced into Aristotelian epistemology, one must first examine the historical and textual channels through which Greek philosophical texts were transmitted into the Islamic world (Gutas, 2014; Peters, 1968). The reception of Aristotle in ninth and tenth century Baghdad was not an unmediated reading of classical Attic Greek manuscripts; rather, it was filtered through late antique Syriac translation movements, Hellenistic commentaries (shurrah), and the intellectual debates of the Baghdad School of Aristotelians, led by scholars such as Hunayn ibn Ishaq, Abu Bishr Matta ibn Yunus, and Yahya ibn 'Adi (Kayacık, 2004; Tekin & Hasırcı, 2022).

The translation movement systematically rendered the Aristotelian *Organon* into Syriac and subsequently into Arabic (Peters, 1968; Doru, 2007; Çapak, 2013). However, along with Aristotle's original treatises came the extensive commentarial tradition of late antiquity, particularly the works of Alexander of Aphrodisias, Themistius, Simplicius, and John Philoponus (Davidson, 1992; Sorabji, 2004; Çapak, 2013; Durusoy, 2023). These late ancient Greek commentators had already begun the process of harmonizing Aristotelian psychology with Neoplatonic metaphysics (Davidson, 1992).

The most influential shift concerning the doctrine of intellect (*nous*) occurred in Alexander of Aphrodisias treatise *De Intellectu (Peri Nou)* (Davidson, 1992). Aristotle in *De Anima* had left the exact ontological status of the active intellect (*nous poietikos*) famously brief and ambiguous (Aristotle, 2018). Alexander of Aphrodisias reinterpreted this passage by making two monumental moves that transformed subsequent philosophical history: first, he identified the human potential intellect as the "material intellect" (*nous hylikos*), comparing it to an unwritten tablet; second, he identified the active intellect (*nous poietikos*) not as an internal faculty of the human soul, but as an external, transcendent cause -identifying it directly with the *Unmoved Mover of Metaphysics Lambda* (Davidson, 1992; Sorabji, 2004).

Themistius, by contrast, diverged from Alexander's reading of the potential intellect while still upholding the transcendence of the Active Intellect. Whereas Alexander regarded the material intellect as a mere disposition inhering in the body and thus perishable, Themistius argued that even the potential intellect is an incorporeal, unmixed, and impassible substance, not dependent on a bodily organ for its activity. By attributing this higher ontological status to the human potential intellect, Themistius preserved a stronger sense of individual human

agency in the process of intellection, while still maintaining, in agreement with Alexander, that the Active Intellect itself remains a separate, transcendent cause acting upon the human soul from without (Davidson, 1992).

When al-Farabi undertook his work in Baghdad, he inherited these exact conceptual distinctions through Arabic translations (Gutas, 2014; Peters, 1968). The Arabic terms *al-'akl al-hayyulani* (material intellect), *al-'akl bi'l-fi'l* (intellect in action), *al-'akl al-mustafad* (acquired intellect), and *al-'akl al-faal* (Active Intellect) are direct linguistic translations of the Greek terminology developed by Alexander and Themistius (Davidson, 1992).

Al-Farabi's historical contribution was to take these Greek commentarial tools and embed them within a systematic, ten-tiered emanationist cosmology derived from Plotinian and Proclan Neoplatonism, while maintaining an unyielding allegiance to Aristotelian demonstrative logic (al-Farabi, 1983; Gutas, 2014). Far from weakening or deviating from the essence of Aristotelian epistemology, al-Farabi used the interpretive tradition of late antiquity to construct a unified metaphysical structure in which logical proof, psychological realization, and cosmic governance operate in perfect harmony.

AL-FARABI'S VIEW OF INTELLECT

Al-Farabi inherits the classical Aristotelian epistemological framework, reconstructing it into a systematic account of the intellect's development from its most basic capacities to its highest demonstrative achievements (al-Farabi, 1983, 2021; Davidson, 1992). Writing within the classical Islamic philosophy, al-Farabi seeks to demonstrate the fundamental harmony between demonstrative logic and metaphysical reality (al-Farabi, 1990a, 2008). While Aristotle approached the operations of *nous* primarily through the lens of natural philosophy and logical justification, al-Farabi expands the scope of intellect (*'akl*) by situating human cognition within an emanationist cosmological architecture (al-Farabi, 1983; Kalyoncu, 2018; Davidson, 1992).

In his *Risalah fi'l-'Akl*, al-Farabi systematically categorizes six distinct semantic and conceptual meanings of the word 'intellect' (*al-'akl*) across ordinary language, theological discourse, and philosophical inquiry (al-Farabi, 1983). First, he identifies the intellect of common discourse, which refers to practical prudence and moral judgment in daily conduct (al-Farabi, 1983). Second, he critiques the theological usage of the term employed by the *Mutakallimun* (scholastic theologians), who reduce intellect to dialectical assertions accepted

by common consensus rather than demonstrative proof (al-Farabi, 1983, 2008; Gutas, 2014). The third meaning corresponds to the faculty discussed in Aristotle's *Categories*, which allows the mind to discern the truth and falsehood of statements (al-Farabi, 1983; Aristotle, 2014a). The fourth meaning represents the practical intellect discussed in *Nicomachean Ethics*, which deliberates over contingent moral actions (al-Farabi, 1983; Aristotle, 2014b). The fifth and most decisive philosophical sense represents the developmental stages of the theoretical intellect analysed (al-Farabi, 1983; Aristotle, 2018; Davidson, 1992). The sixth and highest sense designates the Active Intellect (*al-'akl al-faal*), the transcendent cosmic substance that governs the sublunar sphere and facilitates human intellectual actualization (al-Farabi, 1983, 1990a, 2020b; Uysal, 2004).

Within the theoretical domain, al-Farabi structures human cognitive development as a progressive four-stage evolution of the intellect (al-Farabi, 1983). The developmental journey begins with the Material Intellect (*al-'akl al-hayyulani* or *al-'akl bi'l-quwwah*), which represents the human soul's pure potentiality to receive abstract forms and universal concepts (al-Farabi, 1983). At this initial stage, the human mind is entirely void of actual knowledge, functioning as a bare substrate analogous to a clean tablet awaiting inscriptions (al-Farabi, 1983). As the human mind engages with sensory perceptions and retains empirical impressions via the internal senses, it transitions to the second stage: The intellect in action (*al-'akl bi'l-fi'l*) (al-Farabi, 1983). In this active state, the intellect has abstracted universal forms from sensory particulars and actively possesses foundational concepts and primary logical axioms, such as the principle that the whole is greater than its part (al-Farabi, 1983).

The third stage of developmental completion is reached in the Acquired Intellect (*al-'akl al-mustafad*) (al-Farabi, 1983; Davidson, 1992). At this advanced level, the human intellect no longer relies directly on material objects or sensory images to think (al-Farabi, 1983). Having fully abstracted universal intelligibles, the acquired intellect contemplates pure forms as immaterial objects of thought, effectively becoming identical with the intelligibles it thinks (al-Farabi, 1983). In the Farabian framework, the acquired intellect represents the highest achievable point of human intellectual perfection, serving as the necessary bridge between human cognition and the transcendent realm (al-Farabi, 1983; Durusoy, 2023).

This entire developmental ascent from pure potentiality to complete actualization requires a transcendent mediating agency: The Active Intellect (*al-'akl al-faal*), which constitutes the fourth theoretical intellect in al-Farabi's taxonomy (al-Farabi, 1983, 1990a;

Davidson, 1992). Situated as the tenth intelligence in the emanationist cosmic order, the Active Intellect is an eternally actualized, immaterial substance that continuously radiates intellectual illumination upon the sublunar world. Drawing upon Aristotle's analogy of light in *De Anima*, al-Farabi explains that just as physical sun light transforms potential vision into actual seeing and potential colors into actual visible objects, the Active Intellect radiates an intellectual light that acts upon the human material intellect (al-Farabi, 1983; Aristotle, 2018; Davidson, 1992).

When the light of the Active Intellect illuminates the sensory phantasms stored within human memory and imagination, it strips away their material conditions and renders them actual intelligible concepts (*al-ma'qulat al-bi'l-fi'l*) (al-Farabi, 1983). Simultaneously, this illumination elevates the human material intellect from pure potentiality into an actualized thinking subject (al-Farabi, 1983). Thus, human actualization is not an isolated, internal psychological process; it is a collaborative operation that connects human cognition with an eternal, transcendent source of intelligibility through a process known as conjunction (*ittisal*) (al-Farabi, 1983).

In his masterwork on logical methodology, *Kitab al-Burhan*, al-Farabi provides an analysis of the grounding of scientific knowledge (*'ilm*) and certainty (*yaqin*). Following Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics*, al-Farabi establishes that absolute certainty requires demonstrative proof derived from necessary, primary, and self-evident premises (Aristotle, 1951; Ross, 1949; al-Farabi, 2008; Tekin, 2014). Al-Farabi defines primary premises as foundational truths that are grasped directly and immediately by the intellect without requiring a middle term or demonstrative argument (al-Farabi, 2008; al-Farabi, 1990b; Özpilavcı, 2018).

These primary premises fall into two main categories: primary principles of logic and geometry (such as the law of non-contradiction and basic mathematical axioms) and first intelligibles acquired directly upon sensory experience (al-Farabi, 1992; Aristotle, 2014a). Al-Farabi explains that when a healthy human mind observes sensory particulars, the Active Intellect instantly illuminates the soul, granting immediate, non-discursive awareness of these foundational principles (al-Farabi, 1983). This immediate grasp of primary principles represents the precise locus of 'intuition' (al-Farabi, 1987; Aydoğan, 2021). Intuition does not function as an emotional or mystical state; it is the non-inferential, immediate realization of necessary intellectual starting points that make subsequent demonstrative reasoning (*burhan*) possible (al-Farabi, 2008).

In al-Farabi's epistemology, what may be described analytically as intuitive apprehension should not be understood as an independent faculty of knowledge distinct from intellect. Rather, it refers to the direct apprehension of intelligibles that becomes possible through the perfection and actualization of the human intellect. As the intellect progresses from potentiality to actuality and ultimately reaches the level of the acquired intellect, it becomes capable of apprehending intelligible forms more directly through its relation to the Active Intellect (Durusoy, 2023). Direct intellectual apprehension is therefore not an alternative to rational knowledge or a form of knowledge independent of experience; it represents a higher stage in the actualization of the intellect and the acquisition of intelligibles. The term "intuition" is used here only as an analytical designation for this direct intellectual apprehension, and should not be taken to imply that al-Farabi posits intuition as a separate epistemic faculty (al-Farabi, 1983; Aydın, 2003).

While later Islamic philosophers, particularly Ibn Sina, explicitly formalized the term *hads* to denote the intuitive capacity of the mind to hit upon the middle term of a syllogism without time or effort, al-Farabi anticipates this functional role by treating direct intellectual apprehension as an intrinsic feature of conjunction (*ittisal*) with the Active Intellect (al-Farabi, 1983, 1990b; Ibn Sina, 2006; Gutas, 2014). According to al-Farabi, when intellect reaches the stage of acquired intellect and manages to unite with the Active Intellect, it gains an immediate and clear grasp of complex conceptual relationships (al-Farabi, 1983; Davidson, 1992).

To complete the analytical scope of al-Farabi's epistemology, the relationship between rational demonstration and divine revelation (*wahy*) must be contextualized (al-Farabi, 2021, 2019, 1990a). In works such as *Al-Medinetu'l-Fazila* and *Kitab al-Mille*, al-Farabi explores how the ultimate truths reached through theoretical philosophy are communicated to political communities (al-Farabi, 2021; 1990a). Al-Farabi posits that both the philosopher-king and the prophet receive illumination from the same transcendent source: The Active Intellect (al-Farabi, 1983; Davidson, 1992). However, they receive this illumination through different cognitive faculties and express it for different ends (al-Farabi, 2021).

The philosopher receives the light of the Active Intellect directly through the theoretical intellect, apprehending truth in its pure, abstract, demonstrative form (*burhan*) (al-Farabi, 1983, 2008; Tekin, 2017). The prophet, possessing an exceptionally perfected imaginative faculty (*al-quwwah al-mutakhayyilah*), receives the same intellectual illumination translated into vivid symbols, allegories, and persuasive images (al-Farabi, 2020, 2021; Tülüce, 2021;

Aydın, 2014). Therefore, revelation is a discourse based on the symbolic and rhetorical expression of pure rational truth, designed for the moral education and political governance of the general public who lack training in demonstrative logic (al-Farabi, 2021, 2019).

Crucially, al-Farabi maintains that philosophy is prior to religion in time and cognitive status, because religion represents an imitation of philosophical truths (al-Farabi, 2019). Revelation does not introduce an alternative, anti-rational mode of knowledge that contradicts demonstrative intellect; rather, it functions as the pedagogical boundary of Farabian epistemology, translating the insights of theoretical intellect into a shared consciousness (al-Farabi, 2021, 2019). By framing revelation as a symbolic expression of rational principles, al-Farabi protects the supreme autonomy of demonstrative intellect and ensures that direct intellectual apprehension remains rooted in the systematic perfection of the intellect (al-Farabi, 1983).

Direct Apprehension First Principles and Demonstrative Knowledge in Aristotelian and Farabian Epistemologies

The intellectual relationship between Aristotle and al-Farabi represents one of the most significant structural developments in the history of classical epistemology (Davidson, 1992). Rather than viewing al-Farabi merely as an interpreter who repeated Greek thought in Arabic, a comparative synthesis reveals a dynamic process of structural continuity coupled with profound metaphysical transformation (Peters, 1968). In the domain of direct intellectual apprehension, Aristotle's concepts of *nous* and *noesis* correspond to the concepts of *al-'aql* and *al-ta'qqul* in Al-Farabi. For both thinkers, the apprehension in question is a non-inferential and immediate form of intellectual grasp. However, while in Aristotle *nous* emerges as a faculty operating within the cognitive structure of the human being, Al-Farabi reorganizes this concept within a four-stage developmental model and associates the development of the human intellect with the Active Intellect, a transcendent entity. Thus, the Aristotelian notion of direct apprehension becomes part of a more comprehensive psychological and cosmological framework in Al-Farabi.

In terms of the mechanism of direct apprehension, Aristotle's concept of *noesis* can be compared to Al-Farabi's understanding of *ittisal* (conjunction) and direct *ta'qqul*. Nevertheless, an important distinction exists here. While Avicenna's later-developed concept of *hads* (intuition) becomes a specialized logical mechanism expressing the immediate

apprehension of the middle term of a syllogism, direct apprehension in Al-Farabi is explained within the framework of *ittisal* -that is, conjunction or connection- between the human intellect and the Active Intellect during a sensory encounter (al-Farabi, 1990b). For this intellect, in Al-Farabi's approach, direct apprehension is a dimension of the intellect's process of actualization rather than an independent logical faculty (Türker-Küyel, 1979). Despite this transformation, both philosophers share a commitment to a fundamental rationalism: scientific knowledge (*episteme/‘ilm*) must yield absolute certainty (*yaqin*), and this certainty requires a solid, non-regressive epistemic foundation established through demonstrative logic (*apodeixis/burhan*). (Aristotle, 1951; De Lacy & Yurdaydın & Kutluay, 1971; Aydın, 2003).

At the core of their structural continuity lies the shared solution to the problem of primary premises. Both thinkers recognize that if every premise used in a scientific proof required prior demonstrative justification, human reasoning would be trapped in an infinite regress (*tasalsul*) or a circular argument (*dawr*) (Aristotle, 1951). To break this logical deadlock, both systems posit a non-inferential, immediate capacity of the human mind to apprehend primary principles directly (Aristotle, 1951; al-Farabi, 1990c). In Aristotle, this immediate grasp is performed by *nous* acting upon empirical induction (*epagoge*); in al-Farabi, it is conceptualized as the actualization of the intellect upon sensory encounter through the illuminating agency of the Active Intellect (al-Farabi, 1983; Aristotle, 1951, 2018). In neither system does this direct apprehension function as a mystical, irrational, or emotional insight (Aydoğan, 2021). Instead, 'intuition' serves as an essential, analytical designation for the mind's direct intellectual recognition of self-evident logical axioms and essential definitions.

Despite these shared logical foundations, al-Farabi introduces crucial metaphysical transformations that expand the original Aristotelian framework. The first major transformation concerns the ontology of the Active Intellect (Davidson, 1992). In Aristotle's *De Anima*, the active intellect (*nous poietikos*) is implicitly and briefly described as an immanent but separate cause within or connected to the human psyche, primarily performing a psychological function of realizing potential concepts from sensory images (Aristotle, 2018; Sorabji, 2004). Al-Farabi, drawing upon Neoplatonic commentators such as Alexander of Aphrodisias and Themistius, relocates the Active Intellect (*al-'akl al-faal*) entirely outside the individual human psyche, identifying it as an autonomous, transcendent cosmic intelligence - the tenth intelligence emanating from the First Cause (al-Farabi, 1983, 1990a; Davidson, 1992).

This metaphysical shift fundamentally alters the mechanism of human intellectual actualization (Davidson, 1992). While Aristotle presents the abstraction of universal concepts as the internal cognitive processing of empirical data through memory and induction, al-Farabi treats abstraction as a dual process requiring enlightenment, also related to induction (al-Farabi, 1983, 1990b; Aristotle, 1951, 2018). For al-Farabi, sensory observation prepares the human material intellect, but actual conceptualization occurs only when the transcendent Active Intellect bestows intelligible light upon the soul, enabling conjunction (*ittisal*) between the human mind and cosmic reality (al-Farabi, 1983). Consequently, human intellectual perfection in Farabian thought becomes an ontological ascension from potentiality to the Acquired Intellect (*al-'akl al-mustafad*), bridging human psychology directly with cosmic cosmology (al-Farabi, 1983).

The second key transformation involves the integration of political philosophy and prophetic revelation (*wahy*) into the epistemological architecture (al-Farabi, 2021). Aristotle's epistemology in the *Organon* and *De Anima* remains focused on natural philosophy, scientific methodology, and individual intellectual virtues (Aristotle, 1951, 2014a, 2018). Al-Farabi expands this scope to solve the socio-political problem of communicating demonstrative truth within a diverse human society (al-Farabi, 2021). By demonstrating that the prophet and the theoretical philosopher receive the same intellectual light from the Active Intellect -the former through the imaginative faculty (*al-quwwah al-mutakhayyilah*) in symbolic forms, and the latter through the theoretical intellect in pure logical concepts- al-Farabi incorporates revelation as a symbolic extension of rational philosophy (al-Farabi, 1983, 2021).

Through these structural continuities and creative modifications, al-Farabi preserves the integrity of Aristotelian rationalism while adapting it to answer broader metaphysical and civic questions. Direct intellectual apprehension remains the indispensable anchor of scientific demonstration in both systems, ensuring that rational enquiry rests upon self-evident principles rather than circular assumptions or ungrounded beliefs.

FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

This comparative inquiry into the epistemological frameworks of Aristotle and Abu Nasr al-Farabi reveals a continuous trajectory of rationalist thought that spans from classical antiquity into early Islamic philosophy. At the heart of both thinkers' philosophical projects lies the critical task of securing absolute certainty for scientific knowledge while avoiding the dual logical traps of infinite regress (*tasalsul*) and circular reasoning (*dawr*) in demonstrative proofs.

The comparison of Aristotle and al-Farabi demonstrates that the relationship between intellect and knowledge cannot be adequately explained by reducing knowledge either to demonstrative reasoning or to a separate form of intuitive cognition. In both thinkers, intellectual apprehension has a fundamental role in the constitution of knowledge; however, the epistemological function and metaphysical framework of this apprehension differ significantly. In Aristotle, the acquisition of knowledge begins with sensory experience and develops through experience and the apprehension of universals. Scientific knowledge ultimately depends on the principles that underlie demonstration. These principles cannot themselves be demonstrated through another chain of reasoning; they are apprehended by nous. Thus, nous and demonstrative reasoning perform complementary functions: the former apprehends the principles of knowledge, while the latter derives necessary conclusions from them. Accordingly, the direct apprehension of first principles should not be regarded as an alternative to intellect but as an essential function of intellect within the structure of scientific knowledge.

This point also clarifies the use of the concept of "intuition" in relation to Aristotle. Since "intuition" is not being used as the name of an independent epistemic faculty explicitly formulated in Aristotelian terminology, it is more appropriate to understand it as an analytical term referring to the direct and non-demonstrative apprehension of principles. In this sense, the concept helps describe a distinctive epistemic function of nous without introducing a separate source of knowledge into Aristotle's system. The distinction between direct intellectual apprehension and demonstrative reasoning is therefore more fundamental than an opposition between intuition and reason. The former establishes the principles from which demonstration proceeds, while the latter develops those principles into systematic scientific knowledge.

Al-Farabi develops this intellectual structure within a broader account of the perfection and actualization of the human intellect. His account of the intellect proceeds through different stages, from potentiality to actuality and ultimately to the acquired intellect. At the highest level of intellectual perfection, the human intellect establishes a relation with the Active Intellect and becomes capable of directly apprehending intelligibles. For this reason, what may be described analytically as “intuitive” apprehension in al-Farabi should not be understood as a separate epistemic faculty alongside reason. It is more accurately interpreted as the direct apprehension of intelligibles made possible by the perfection of the intellect. The central epistemological issue in al-Farabi is therefore not the opposition between intuition and reason, but the process through which the human intellect becomes capable of apprehending intelligible realities directly.

The relation between intellectual apprehension and revelation further distinguishes al-Farabi's account from a simple theory of intuition. Although both philosophical knowledge and prophetic revelation are related to the Active Intellect, they are not identical modes of cognition. Philosophical knowledge is primarily associated with the perfection of the intellect and the direct apprehension of intelligibles. Prophetic revelation, by contrast, involves the additional function of the imaginative faculty, through which intelligible realities can be represented in forms accessible to the community. The distinction between philosophical and prophetic knowledge should therefore not be expressed merely as a distinction between intellect and revelation. Rather, it concerns different modes of receiving, apprehending, and representing intelligible content. This distinction also prevents the reduction of revelation to intuition and avoids treating intellectual apprehension as equivalent to prophetic representation.

The comparison consequently reveals both continuity and transformation between Aristotle and al-Farabi. The continuity lies in the central role assigned to intellect in the acquisition of intelligible knowledge and in the recognition that demonstrative knowledge presupposes principles that cannot themselves be established through demonstration. The transformation occurs in al-Farabi's reconstruction of this intellectual structure within a more comprehensive epistemological and metaphysical framework. By distinguishing the stages of intellectual actualization and relating the perfection of the human intellect to the Active Intellect, al-Farabi extends the Aristotelian account of intellectual apprehension into a theory that also provides a systematic account of prophecy and revelation.

Accordingly, the fundamental difference between Aristotle and al-Farabi should not be reduced to the contrast between a supposedly static Aristotelian intellect and a dynamic Farabian reason, nor between intellect in Aristotle and revelation in al-Farabi. Aristotle's account emphasizes the epistemic function of *nous* in apprehending first principles and the role of demonstration in transforming these principles into scientific knowledge. Al-Farabi retains this rational structure while placing it within a developmental account of intellectual perfection and a metaphysical relation between the human intellect and the Active Intellect. His account consequently makes it possible to explain, within a single epistemological framework, the direct apprehension of intelligibles, the perfection of philosophical knowledge, and the distinctive mode of prophetic revelation.

In this respect, the concept of “intuition” is most useful not as a common historical category attributed identically to Aristotle and al-Farabi, but as an analytical term that draws attention to the direct apprehension of intelligible principles and forms. Once this distinction is maintained, the relationship between reason, knowledge, and direct apprehension becomes clearer: in Aristotle, *nous* provides the non-demonstrative apprehension of the principles on which scientific knowledge depends; in al-Farabi, the direct apprehension of intelligibles is incorporated into the progressive perfection of the intellect and its relation to the Active Intellect.

The investigation confirms that both Aristotle and al-Farabi resolve the problem of foundational grounding by establishing a necessary, non-inferential cognitive mechanism: the direct intellectual apprehension of primary, indemonstrable starting points (*archai*). In Aristotle's methodology, *nous* operates as the ultimate principle of demonstration, directly grasping self-evident axioms and universal essences upon the occasion of empirical induction (*epagoge*). In al-Farabi's system, this non-discursive apprehension is conceptualized within a dynamic psychological and cosmological framework, wherein the human material intellect ascends through progressive stages of actualization to reach the acquired intellect (*al-'akl al-mustafad*) through conjunction (*ittisal*) with the transcendent Active Intellect.

Crucially, this study clarifies that ‘intuition’ does not function as an anti-rational, emotional, or mystical faculty in the technical vocabulary of either philosopher. Instead, intuition serves as a precise analytical term designating the non-discursive, immediate realization of foundational truths that make discursive, syllogistic demonstration (*apodeixis/burhan*) possible. Furthermore, al-Farabi's approach to divine revelation (*wahy*)

does not disregard demonstrative reason; on the contrary, it forms the pedagogical and ethical boundary of his system, symbolically translating theoretical truths for guidance without weakening the highest epistemic authority of philosophy.

Ultimately, al-Farabi's synthesis represents not a departure from Aristotelian empirical rationalism into Neoplatonic mysticism, but a creative, structural development of classical epistemology. By integrating logic, and cosmology, al-Farabi provided a more holistic framework for explaining the process of human intellectual progress, while preserving the essential qualities of Aristotle's theory of *nous*.

REFERENCES

- Al-Farabi. (1983). *Risalat Fi'l Akl*. Beirut: Dar El Maşrik.
- Al-Farabi. (1987). *Fusulü'l-Medeni*. (Trans. Hanifi Özcan). İzmir: Dokuz Eylül University Publ.
- Al-Farabi. (1990a). *El-Medinetü'l-Fazıla*. (Trans. Nafiz Danışman), İstanbul: MEB Publ.
- Al-Farabi. (1990b). "Küçük Kıyas Kitabı". In *Fârâbî'nin Bazı Mantık Eserleri*. (Trans. Mübahat Türker Küyel). Ankara: Presidency of the Atatürk Culture, Language and History High Institution Publ.
- Al-Farabi. (1990c). *Şera'it ul-Yakin*. (Trans. Mübahat Türker-Küyel). Ankara: Presidency of the Atatürk Culture, Language and History High Institution Publ.
- Al-Farabi. (1992). *Farabi'nin Geometri Felsefesine İlişkin Metinler*. (Trans. Mübahat Türker-Küyel). Ankara: Presidency of the Atatürk High Institution for Culture, Language and History Publ.
- Al-Farabi. (2008). *Kitâbu'l-Burhân*. (Trans. Ömer Türker & Ömer Mahir Alper). İstanbul: Klasik Publ.
- Al-Farabi. (2019). *İlimlerin Sayımı*. (Trans. Ahmet Arslan). İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Publ.
- Al-Farabi. (2020a). *es-Siyasetü'l-Medeniyye*. (Trans. Yaşar Aydınli), İstanbul: Litera Publ.
- Al-Farabi. (2020b). *Kitab el-Fusus fi'l-Hikme & Uyunü'l-Mesa'il fi'l-Mantık ve Mebadi' el-Felsefetü'l-Kadime*. (Trans. Mehmet Dağ). İstanbul: Endülüs Publ.
- Al-Farabi. (2021). *Kitâbü'l-Mille, Din Üzerine*. (Trans. Yaşar Aydınli). İstanbul: Litera Publ.
- Altunya, H., & Keleş Türkyılmaz, S. (2023). "Aristoteles'e Göre Kanıt Temelinde İnanç, Bilgi ve Mantık ilişkisi". *Suleyman Demirel University Faculty of Theology Journal*. 51, 81-97.
- Aristotle. (1951). *II. Analitikler*. (Trans. H. Ragıp Atademir). İstanbul: MEB Publ.
- Aristotle. (1996a). *Metafizik*. (Trans. Ahmet Arslan). İstanbul: Sosyal Publ.
- Aristotle. (1996b). *I. Analitikler*. (Trans. H. Ragıp Atademir). İstanbul: MEB Publ.
- Aristotle. (1996c). *Topikler* (Trans. H. Ragıp Atademir). İstanbul: MEB Publ.
- Aristotle. (2014a). *Kategoriler*. (Trans. Saffet Babür). Ankara: İmge Publ, Vol. 3.

- Aristotle. (2014b). *Nikhomakos'a Etik*. (Trans. Saffet Babür). Ankara: Bilgesu Publ.
- Aristotle. (2018). *De Anima (Ruh Üzerine)*. (Trans Zeki Özcan.). Bursa: Sentez Publ.
- Aydın, İ. (2003). *Farabî'de Bilgi Teorisi*. İstanbul: Ötüken Publ.
- Aydınlı, Y. (2008). *Fârâbî*. İstanbul: İsam Publ.
- Aydınlı, Y. (2014). *Fârâbî'de Tanrı-İnsan İlişkisi*, İstanbul: İz Publ.
- Aydoğan, H. (2021). "Epagoge'den Episteme'ye: Sezgisel Kavrayış". *Kutadgubilig Felsefe-Bilim Araştırmaları*. 43, 35-52.
- Bolay, H. (1989). "Akıl". *TDV Islamic Encyclopedia*. 2/238-240. İstanbul: TDV Publ.
- Burnyeat, M. F. (1981). *Aristotle on Understanding Knowledge*. Editrice Antenore.
- Çapak, İ. (2013). "Süryanilerin Mantık İlmine Katkıları". *Mukaddime* 7, 1-21.
- Davidson, H. A. (1992). *Al-Farabi, Avicenna, and Averroes on intellect: Their cosmologies, theories of the active intellect, and theories of human intellect*. Oxford University Press.
- De Lacy, O. L., Yurdaydın, H. G., & Kutluay, Y. (1971). *İslâm Düşüncesi ve Tarihteki Yeri*. Ankara: Ankara University Publ.
- Doru, N. (2007). *Doğu'dan Batı'ya Köprü Süryaniler, Felsefe ve Çeviri Geleneği*. Ankara: Dipnot Publ.
- Durusoy, A. (2023). *İslam Mantık Tarihi Araştırmaları I, Ebû Nasr Fârâbî*. İstanbul: Marmara University Faculty of Theology Foundation Publ.
- Gutas, D. (2014). *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition: Introduction to Reading Avicenna's Philosophical Works* (2nd ed.). Brill.
- Ibn Sina. (2006). *II. Analitikler, Burhan, Kitabu's-Şifa*, (Trans. Ömer Türker). İstanbul: Litera Publ.
- Irwin, T. (1990). *Aristotle's first principles*. Oxford University Press.
- Kalyoncu, R. T. (2018). "Fârâbî'nin Akıl Risalesinin Felsefi Analizi". *FLSF Journal of Philosophy and Social Sciences*. 13(26), 61-78.
- Kaya, M. (1983). *İslam Kaynakları Işığında Aristoteles ve Felsefesi*. İstanbul: Ekin Publ.
- Kayacık, A. (2004). *Bağdat Okulu ve İslam Düşüncesindeki Yeri*. İstanbul: Üniversite Kitabevi Publ.
- Köz, İ. (2004). "Sezgi'nin Bilgideki Yeri ve Önemi". *Felsefe Dünyası*. (40), 41-54.
- Özel, A. (2008). "Organon ve Mantık". *Hitit University Faculty of Theology Journal*. 7(14), 147-160.
- Özpilavcı, F. (2018). *Fârâbî'nin Önerme Anlayışı*. İstanbul: Litera Publ.
- Peters, F. E. (1968). *Aristoteles Arabus: The Oriental Translations and Commentaries on the Aristotelian Corpus*. Leiden: E. J. Brill.
- Ross, W. D. (1949). *Prior and Posterior Analytics*. Clarendon Press.
- Sarı, M. A. (2011). "Aristoteles'te İlk İlkelerin Bilgisi ve Nous Üzerine". *Kaygı*. 16, 123-131.
- Sorabji, R. (2004). *The Philosophy of the Commentators, 200-600 AD: 400 Years of Transition: a Sourcebook*. Duckworth.

Tekin, A & Hasırcı, N. (2022). “V. Asırdan XI. Asır İslâm Dünyasına Tevarüs Edilen Aristoteles’in Eserlerine Başlanmadan Önce Bilinmesi Gerekli On Temel İlke”. *Ortaçağ Araştırmaları Dergisi* 5/2, 368-380.

Tekin, A. (2014). “Aristoteles’in ‘Analütika Hüsterâ’ (Kitâbu’l-Burhân) Adlı Eseri, Meşşâî Gelenekteki Yeri ve Üzerine Yazılan Şerhler”. *Iğdır University Faculty of Theology Journal* 3 43-86.

Tekin, A. (2017). *Varlık ve Akıl, Aristoteles ve Fârâbî’de Burhan Teorisi*. İstanbul: Klasik Publ.

Tülüce, H. A. (2021). “Kavram ve İmge Bağlamında Fârâbî’de Felsefe-Din İlişkisi”. *Mecmua*. 12, 299-311.

Türker-Küyel, M. (1979). “Farabi’de Düşünce ve Dil Arasındaki İlişki”. *Araştırma*. 11, Ankara: DTCF Publ.

Uysal, E. (2004). “Kindî ve Fârâbî’de Akıl ve Nefs Kavramlarının Ahlâkî İçeriği”. *Uludağ University Faculty of Theology Journal*. 13(2).

RESUMO

Este estudo apresenta uma análise comparativa dos arcabouços epistemológicos e metodológicos de Aristóteles e Abu Nasr al-Farabi, com foco particular na interação entre intelecto (*nous*/'akl), conhecimento (*episteme*/'ilm) e percepção intelectual direta ('intuição'). A epistemologia na antiguidade clássica e na tradição filosófica islâmica medieval confrontou o problema fundamental de fundamentar a demonstração científica (*apodeixis*/*burhan*) sem cair em regressão infinita ou raciocínio circular. Aristóteles resolve esse dilema fundamentando o conhecimento na observação empírica (*aisthesis*) e na indução (*epagoge*), enquanto atribui ao *nous* a função não inferencial de apreender diretamente os primeiros princípios primários e indemonstráveis (*archai*) dos quais depende o conhecimento demonstrativo. Reinterpretando e expandindo essa herança aristotélica dentro da filosofia islâmica clássica, al-Farabi situa a apreensão direta de inteligíveis em uma estrutura dinâmica e desenvolvimentista de atualização intelectual humana – avançando da potencialidade (intelecto material) para a atualidade (intelecto em ação) e, finalmente, para o intelecto adquirido (*al-'akl al-mustafad*) por meio de sua relação formal com o Intelecto Ativo transcendente (*al-'akl al-fa''al*). Esta investigação esclarece que a “intuição” não funciona como uma faculdade autônoma, mística ou antirracional no léxico técnico de nenhum dos pensadores. Em vez disso, serve como uma designação analítica para a apreensão direta e não discursiva de inteligíveis primários e axiomas fundamentais. Este estudo visa destacar as diferenças entre as epistemologias aristotélica e farabiana, comparando como ambos os filósofos classificaram o conhecimento, explicaram a transição da experiência sensorial para conceitos universais e integraram a percepção intelectual não discursiva ao raciocínio lógico.

Palavras-chave: Lógica; Aristóteles; Al-Farabi; Epistemologia; Intelecto; Conhecimento; Intuição.

Recebido em 16/03/2024

Aprovado para publicação em 07/11/2024